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Abstract—Securing cyber-physical systems is hard. They are
complex infrastructures comprising multiple technological arte-
facts, designers, operators and users. Existing research has
established the security challenges in such systems as well as the
role of usable security to support humans in effective security
decisions and actions. In this paper we focus on smart cyber-
physical systems, such as those based on the Internet of Things
(IoT). Such smart systems aim to intelligently automate a variety
of functions, with the goal of hiding that complexity from the user.
Furthermore, the interactions of the user with such systems are
more often implicit than explicit, for instance, a pedestrian with
wearables walking through a smart city environment will most
likely interact with the smart environment implicitly through a
variety of inferred preferences based on previously provided or
automatically collected data. The key question that we explore
is that of empowering software engineers to pragmatically take
into account how users make informed security choices about
their data and information in such a pervasive environment. We
discuss a range of existing frameworks considering the impact
of automation on user behaviours and argue for the need of a
shift—from usability to security ergonomics as a key requirement
when designing and implementing security features in smart
cyber-physical environments. Of course, the considerations apply
more broadly than security but, in this paper, we focus only on
security as a key concern.
Index Terms—Security Ergonomics, Human Factors, Internet
of Things, IoT, HFACS, Cyber-Physical Systems, CPS
I. INTRODUCTION
For some, cyber-physical systems (CPS) are purely “en-
gineered systems that are built from, and depend upon, the
seamless integration of computational and physical compo-
nents” [1]. The reality is that all cyber-physical systems
also contain a human component – from their design and
implementation through to deployment, usage, maintenance,
evolution and decommissioning.
Within this complex socio-technical system all three com-
ponents are not only potential points of weakness but may also
attack (maliciously or inadvertently) any other component.
However, each component also plays a vital role in the
protection of the others. As an emergent CPS, the Internet of
Things (IoT) is no different. However the sheer scale, velocity
of adoption and pervasiveness of the IoT presents, combined
with on-system resource limitations, fundamental challenges
to software engineering and how best to ensure the safety and
security of the IoT. Understanding which role each component
(including the human) should fulfil and which responsibility
it should take in security is critical.
Security work in CPS has often focussed upon technical
advancement, the role of humans being viewed as little more
than a hazard - one who through error or mistake (intentional
or otherwise) is at fault or to blame for security problems.
Whilst this may be true to some extent – the human is an
intrinsic component of the CPS – the culture of blame has
led to a misconception that better security comes from better
systems, with better smarter technology ideally removing the
need for or use by humans. In other words, by eliminating
those erroneous or mistaken behaviours for which the human
condition is responsible, security risk can be more readily
managed. If anything this is a self-fulfilling prophecy — the
more effort placed into better smarter technology the more
likely it is that, in the event of failure, the human is seen as
in error and therefore further effort needing to be put into
further technological improvement. Research in the safety
domain has shown that, whilst technological advances can
remove cogntive load from humans, and to a degree mitigate
error, there comes a point where “automation... simply shifts
the error” [2] – normally to the designer / developer. An
example of smart-automation failing is the case of Air France
Flight 447 where advances in auto-pilot software resulted
in critical manual flight training and practice being deemed
unnecessary, with fatal consequences [3].
Recent work [4] has analysed the role of latent design
conditions in impacting security perceptions of operators in
industrial control systems and highlighted the challenges posed
by smart CPS, notably their emergent design arising from
dynamic aggregation of a range of devices and services and
the focus on automation that aims to “hide” complexity from
the users. Whilst usability is considered a key non-functional
requirement during software engineering and there is a body
of research on usable security, in this paper we argue that
the very properties of emergent design and automation pose
key challenges with regards to security behaviours in smart
CPS. It is part of the human condition to err [5], sometimes
deliberately, but more often inadvertently. But being able to
recognise and learn from those errors is fundamental in mov-
ing socio-technical systems, such as IoT, forward. However,
as smartness takes the human increasingly out of the loop, it
is difficult to understand ‘how did a security breach happen’
in relation to human behaviour and how that behaviour might
have been fostered or indeed made inevitable by the design
and / or environment of the system.
We, therefore, argue for a new type of non-functional
requirement for smart CPS: security ergonomics that considers
humans as integral to a smart CPS environment and, following
the definition by the International Ergonomics Association def-
inition, is concerned with “the understanding of interactions
among humans and other elements of a system, and applying
theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to
optimize human well-being and overall system performance.”
Such a notion of security ergonomics moves far beyond
understanding user requirements or simple human-machine
interactions pertaining to security. Instead it brings insight
into how humans behave (physically and psychologically) in
relation to particular environments, products, or services.
The novel contributions of our work are a set of
foundational design principles for security ergonomics which
can be utilised to mitigate the impact of human error and
security vulnerabilities in smart cyber-physical systems.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Firstly back-
ground and related work introducing our conceptual model and
usable security works. Secondly we briefly detail two exten-
sions to this conceptual model. Thirdly we present rationale for
our initial design principles and open these up for discussion.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Conceptual Model
Our conceptual model of a smart CPS environment is the
SHEL model developed by Edwards in the early 1970s, which
Hawkins [6] modified into the building block structure (see
Figure 1a) widely used in human factors research today. SHEL
is simply an acronym for the core components at play:
Software - the procedures, checklists, symbology and com-
puter software.
Hardware - the physical thing(s) being interacted with.
Environment - the situation within which the L-H-S system
must operate.
Liveware - the human(s) with the one at the centre of the
model being the most critical.
The model also has a SCHELL variant which separates out
organisational Culture from the environment but essentially
remains synonymous with Hawkins’ blocks. The SHEL(L)
model is widely used to explore the interfaces between humans
(the liveware) and the other blocks in aviation where some
mismatch in those interfaces may lead to a source of human
error or system vulnerability.
B. Usable Security
Existing research in non-CPS settings, for instance, Adams’
and Sasse’s seminal paper [7], has highlighted the multiple
roles that humans play in a secure system and how issues in
the design of security controls lead to poor security practises
on the part of the user. Building upon this work, West [8]
looked to explain, from a psychological perspective, why
users made poor security decisions with user interfaces. He
found, principally, that users were unmotivated in making good
security choices, often not feeling at risk and that security was
a secondary task compared to real work. West concluded that
in order for users to make better security choices they needed
to be better motivated by rewarding pro-secure behaviour (the
antithesis of blame which seeks to punish poor choices).
In 2011 the National Science and Technology Council
(NTSC), when addressing the current state of security called
for a more scientific approach to security research including
“sound methods for integrating humans in the system” [9].
Three years later Manusco [10] acknowledged that whilst this
more scientific human factors approach to addressing cyber-
security issues had begun it had “yet to scratch the surface.”
Though research has looked at using smart CPS devices as
a means to counter usability limitations of existing security
feature designs, e.g., [11], the issues of security ergonomics
in smart CPS environments have not been considered to
date. Recent work by Frey et al [4] has discussed the role
that system design plays in influencing operator perceptions
during security incidents and highlighted potential challenges
in the context of smart CPS. In this paper, we respond to the
challenges highlighted by Frey et al and focus on security
ergonomics as a key requirement for smart CPS.
III. EXISTING ERGONOMICS FRAMEWORKS
To develop our security ergonomics concepts for smart
CPS, we draw upon two existing frameworks in the safety
and aviation domain, namely the Swiss Cheese model [12]
and the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) [13].
A. Swiss Cheese
The human factors psychologist James Reason’s works on
industrial, aviation and clinical accident investigation [12] have
developed what has become known as the Swiss Cheese model
(SC). The SC looks to human error (an unsafe act) as an active
failure, and these may be both intentional or unintentional.
System vulnerability is termed a latent failure. SC takes the
view that truly bad events occur when both an active and a
latent failure coincide. A mid-nineties variation of the SC
(see Figure 1b) nicely illustrates the relationship between
such active and latent failures (later versions exist but this
illustration is more self-explanatory).
By way of an example, we have seen a number of malev-
olent secondments of consumer grade IoT devices into the
Mirai botnets [14], [15] during 2016. A great many of the
bots were gained through a confluence of user error (active
failures) in not changing default passwords and security issues
with the devices themselves (latent failures), such as providing
no method for retrospectively applying security patches or up-
dating firmware [16], hard-coding administration user-names
and passwords into the firmware of devices and using the
same administration credentials for both web and SSH/Telnet
(a) SHEL(L) based on Hawkins’ model (b) Reason’s Swiss Cheese model (1990’s variation) (c) HFACS (Aviation) Classification System
Fig. 1: Models for Human Factors
access [17]. From the user’s perspective they were utterly unin-
formed about these latent failures in the devices - a situational
level alignment in the SC model. Moreover, it seems likely that
the promise of a webcam which enabled the owner to watch,
for example, a pet munching on biscuits probably over-rode
any awareness that the device was effectively broadcasting
their home to anyone with those default credentials and that
had they been aware their purchase and erroneous installation
might have been more considered.
B. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
Borrowing heavily from Reason’s SC, the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) [13] developed
by Shappel & Weigmann for use in aviation is a root-cause
analysis that can identify latent (and active) factors that can
contribute to incidents. Critically, and congruent with Reason,
HFACS specifies “that in order for an incident to occur,
failures in defences at all levels of the system must line up,”
[18]. HFACS describes four levels of failure: i) Unsafe acts (on
the part of the human or liveware), ii) Preconditions for those
unsafe acts (the direct factors impacting upon the human),
iii) Unsafe supervision, and iv) Organisational influence (see
Figure 1c). Whilst HFACS is not without its critics — these
primarily being around the validity of statistical techniques
and inter-coder reliability — it has been successfully modified
and implemented beyond aviation for the design of robust
and resilient healthcare [19], [20], rail transportation [18] and
mining [21] practices.
IV. DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SECURITY ERGONOMICS IN
SMART CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Human factors has evolved from conceptual models (SHEL)
into actionable methodology (HFACS) for systems design to
the point where, certainly in aviation, it is no longer a ‘thing’
that is done but an embedded part of the system lifecycle [2].
A position we believe software engineering should aspire to.
When looking at the relationship between ‘Privacy by
Design’ (PbD) and the concept of ‘privacy enhancing tech-
nologies’ (PETs) incepted some ten years prior, European
Data Protection Supervisor Peter Hustinx links an increasing
number of data breaches to being a structural problem not
resolved by those PETs and argues that this presents an
opportunity for further PbD focus [22]. Therefore, whilst we
agree with Proctor and Chen [23] that human factors (as
ergonomics) should be contributing to the science of cyber-
security we firmly believe that this contribution would be
of greater impact were those ergonomics - as a set of clear
fundamental ideas - codified into simple design principles that
could be adopted and utilised by anyone developing smart
CPS.
As with ‘security by design’ and ‘privacy by design’ before,
such principles look to embed those fundamentals within the
very fabric of the development life-cycle rather than bolting
human factor aware security on as an afterthought as is
so often the case with CPS. We would also recommend
that ‘security ergonomics by design’ should form one of the
basic principles of ‘security by design’ efforts, such as the
UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Security Design
Principle for Digital Services [24].
To this we propose that a set of design principles for security
ergonomics within smart CPS be developed collaboratively
by the software engineering, human factors and security
communities. We offer an initial five principles, based on
Cavourkian’s PbD work [25], to stimulate discussion:
1 - Proactive security ergonomic design, not reactive
remedy. The approach anticipates / identifies and prevents
active user error and latent system failures before they happen.
It does not provide remedy for error / failure - it aims to
prevent them before-the-fact. E.g., with reference to the Mirai
botnet example already expressed, security ergonomics should
identify the likelihood that users would not change default
settings and make this visible to developers from the outset.
2 - Security ergonomics embedded into the design. The
approach is embedded into the design and architecture of smart
cyber-physical systems and not bolted on as a feature or add-
on. Security ergonomics therefore becomes an essential inte-
gral property of the system without diminishing functionality.
3 - Design should encourage secure behaviours. By default
secure non-erroneous user behaviour is encouraged and where
possible enforced. E.g., users should be prompted to set secure
passwords at setup, and where possible and appropriate this
should be a modal activity, not allowing the user to proceed
until an action is taken.
4 - Non-alignment by default. As human error is inevitable,
security ergonomic design should prevent alignment of active
error and latent failures. E.g., the alignment of users being able
to not change default passwords at setup and those defaults
being hard-coded into firmware, by default should not be
allowed.
5 - External design validation. As any smart CPS is
developed by human(s) — who by definition are subject
to bias, assumption and indeed mistake — we must apply
human factors to the development itself. Standard software
development practices such as automated and unit testing can
help with this validation although care must be taken that these
themselves are not biased.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we reiterate the need for human factors to
be utilised within cyber-security. We present argument as to
how smart CPS, as complex socio-technical systems, pose
an additional set of challenges to humans from design to
usage, and set out how in other safety-concerned domains
methodology such as HFACS has been used to good effect
to both understand and inform system design.
Firstly, we propose that to untangle the complex socio-
technical relationships which are inherent and vastly com-
plicated in smart CPS, and that give rise to safety issues
and security failings in IoT, HFACS offers a methodological
route forward. Diller et al’s work in moving HFACS to health
care [19] provides a potential method which would enable the
software engineering community to re-purpose HFACS.
Secondly, to stimulate security ergonomics discussion, we
present five initial design principles. We call upon the com-
bined efforts of the human factors, software engineering and
security communities to undertake the refinements needed
to derive a clear set of simple, usable design principles for
security ergonomics to help address the increasing tide of
safety and security concerns within smart CPS and especially
the Internet of Things.
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